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    Constitutional Amendment and Basic Structure Docket | <a href="https://constitutionwatchdog.org/crime-data-accountability-index/">Constitution</a> Watchdog
    Comparative constitutional amendment and basic-structure mapping

    Constitutional Amendment
    and Basic Structure Docket

    A publication-grade South Asian docket mapping amendment architecture and constitutional-identity limits across Bangladesh, India, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, Maldives and Sri Lanka. The docket now combines the amendment-procedure layer with the basic-structure, salient-features, eternity-clause, referendum-entrenchment and amendment-review layer.

    Explore the register Open basic-structure map Open the matrix
    01 · Executive map

    Amendment architecture and constitutional-identity limits

    Use this table as the executive summary before moving into country-specific provision cards and the basic-structure register.

    Country Core amendment provisions Formal threshold Referendum / federal lock Basic-structure / identity layer Review / finality posture
    Bangladesh 7, 7A, 7B, 26(3), 142 Two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament; presidential assent or deemed assent. No ordinary referendum; no subnational consent. Judicially recognized basic-structure doctrine and textual entrenchment through Article 7B. Article 26(3) excludes ordinary Article 26 rights-inconsistency review of Article 142 amendments, but Article 7B and the basic-structure line operate as amendment limits.
    India 13(4), 368 Special majority in each House: majority of total membership plus two-thirds present and voting. Ratification by not less than one-half of State legislatures for listed federal matters. Judicially entrenched basic-structure doctrine since Kesavananda Bharati. Article 368(4)–(5) contains textual anti-review/no-limitation language, but the Supreme Court’s basic-structure doctrine treats amendment power as limited.
    Bhutan 2(26), 33(9), 34, 35 Motion by simple majority at joint sitting; final passage by three-fourths at the next session’s joint sitting; royal assent. National referendum required for Article 2 and Article 1(2) matters under Article 2(26); fallback referendum possible if royal assent is withheld. No free-standing reported basic-structure doctrine; constitutional identity is protected textually through referendum and emergency bars. Article 35 is expressly subject to Article 2(26) and Article 33(9); Constitution cannot be amended during emergency.
    Nepal 274 Two-thirds of the total number of the then members of both Houses of the Federal Parliament. State Assembly consent for State-boundary and Schedule-6 matters. Textual eternity clause: no amendment prejudicial to sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence or sovereignty vested in the people. Article 274(1) is itself unamendable; no separate amendment-specific judicial-review clause is set out in Article 274.
    Pakistan 238, 239 Two-thirds of total membership of each House. Affected Provincial Assembly consent by two-thirds total membership for provincial boundary alteration. Salient-features/basic-structure line recognized in the 21st Amendment litigation, but current text creates an express anti-review posture. Post-27th Amendment Article 239(5) bars courts from calling any constitutional amendment into question on any ground; Article 239(6) declares no limitation on Parliament’s amendment power.
    Maldives 70(b)(1), 258, 261–267, 268 Three-quarters majority of the total membership of the People’s Majlis. Referendum approval required for Article 262(b) protected categories; 2026 Eighth Amendment referendum failed and therefore did not alter current text. No identified judicial basic-structure doctrine; constitutional identity is protected through referendum-entrenched provisions, supremacy and emergency limits. No amendment during a state of emergency; presidential non-assent may trigger public referendum mechanism.
    Sri Lanka 79–85, 120–124, 154G(2)–(3) Two-thirds of the whole number of MPs, including those not present; referendum where Article 83 applies. Mandatory referendum for Article 83 entrenched matters; Provincial Council reference for Chapter XVIIA/Ninth Schedule amendments. No Indian-style free-standing basic-structure doctrine entrenched as such; constitutional identity is primarily mediated by Article 83 and pre-enactment review. Supreme Court pre-enactment review determines inconsistency and referendum necessity; Article 80 certificate finality bars post-enactment challenge.
    02 · Basic-structure register

    Doctrine, eternity clauses and referendum-entrenched identity

    This section separates jurisdictions with enforceable judicial doctrine from those with textual entrenchment or referendum controls only.

    Country Status Source type Protected core Use this wording
    Bangladesh Judicial doctrine + textual entrenchment. Anwar Hossain Chowdhury; 16th Amendment line; Article 7B. Constitutional supremacy, democratic/republican foundations, unitary constitutional order, independence of judiciary, separation of powers and fundamental constitutional commitments, depending on the case context. “Bangladesh has a judicially recognized basic-structure doctrine, now reinforced by Article 7B’s textual non-amendability formula.”
    India Full judicial basic-structure doctrine. Kesavananda Bharati; Indira Gandhi; Minerva Mills and later cases. Constitutional supremacy, republican and democratic government, secularism, federalism, separation of powers, judicial review, free and fair elections, limited amending power and institutional identity. “India is the source jurisdiction of the South Asian basic-structure doctrine: Parliament may amend, but may not damage or destroy the Constitution’s basic structure.”
    Bhutan Textual constitutional-identity protection; no Indian-style doctrine identified. Article 2(26), Article 33(9), Article 35. Monarchical and territorial identity provisions protected through referendum; emergency amendment ban; equally authoritative Dzongkha and English texts. “Bhutan should be classified as a referendum-and-emergency-entrenchment model, not as a judicial basic-structure-doctrine model.”
    Nepal Textual eternity clause. Article 274(1) and proviso to Article 274(2). Sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence of Nepal and sovereignty vested in the people. “Nepal uses an express eternity clause rather than a developed Indian-style basic-structure doctrine.”
    Pakistan Salient-features doctrine under tension with current anti-review text. 21st Amendment litigation; Article 239(5)–(6) as amended by 27th Amendment. Historically discussed salient features include Islamic provisions, federalism, parliamentary democracy and judicial independence; current text purports to bar court challenges to amendments. “Pakistan must be marked as doctrinally contested and textually anti-review after the 27th Amendment; do not describe the basic-structure limit as presently uncomplicated.”
    Maldives Referendum-entrenched constitutional identity; no identified judicial doctrine. Articles 262(b), 265–267, 268; Sixth Amendment 2024; 2026 referendum episode. Chapter II rights and selected institutional/term provisions protected through referendum; Article 262(b) itself protected after the Sixth Amendment; emergency bar under Article 267. “Maldives should be treated as a high-supermajority-and-referendum-entrenchment model, not as a basic-structure case-law model.”
    Sri Lanka Article 83 entrenchment and pre-enactment Supreme Court gatekeeping; no settled free-standing doctrine. Articles 82–85, 120–124, 154G. Articles 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, Article 83 itself, and term extensions beyond six years; devolution amendments trigger Article 154G referral. “Sri Lanka’s identity limit is best mapped through Article 83 referendum entrenchment and Supreme Court pre-enactment review, not as a broad Indian-style basic-structure doctrine.”
    03 · Country register

    Searchable jurisdiction cards

    Filter by country or search by article, doctrine, referendum, federal consent, anti-review, eternity clause or basic-structure marker.

    BD

    Bangladesh

    Textual entrenchment plus judicial basic structure
    Doctrine + text

    Article 142 supplies the amendment route. Article 7B creates a textual non-amendability layer, while the Eighth Amendment case line recognizes basic-structure limits on amendment power.

    Art. 7BArt. 26(3)Art. 142Anwar Hossain
    ThresholdTwo-thirds of total MPs.
    Basic layerJudicial doctrine reinforced by Article 7B.
    Safe wording“Basic-structure doctrine is recognized; Article 7B textually entrenches specified fundamentals.”
    Docket note

    Do not treat Article 26(3) as eliminating all amendment review. It excludes Article 26’s ordinary rights-inconsistency review of Article 142 amendments, while Article 7B and the judicial basic-structure doctrine remain central to amendment-control analysis.

    IN

    India

    Judicial source jurisdiction of the doctrine
    Full doctrine

    Article 368 prescribes amendment power and procedure, but Kesavananda Bharati and later cases establish that amendment power cannot damage or destroy the Constitution’s basic structure.

    Art. 13(4)Art. 368KesavanandaMinerva Mills
    ThresholdSpecial majority in each House; State ratification for listed federal matters.
    Basic layerJudicially enforceable doctrine of limited amendment power.
    Safe wording“Amendment is wide but not destructive of basic structure.”
    Docket note

    Article 368(4)–(5) must be mapped as text, but the doctrinal position cannot be stated from text alone because Minerva Mills and the basic-structure line treat unlimited amendment power as unconstitutional.

    BT

    Bhutan

    Referendum and emergency entrenchment
    Textual limits

    Article 35 allows amendment by delayed joint-sitting supermajority and royal assent, but it is expressly subject to Article 2(26) and Article 33(9).

    Art. 2(26)Art. 33(9)Art. 34Art. 35
    ThresholdThree-fourths at next-session joint sitting after initiation.
    Basic layerNo free-standing doctrine identified; protected via referendum and emergency bar.
    Safe wording“Textual constitutional-identity safeguards, not Indian-style basic-structure doctrine.”
    Docket note

    Article 2(26) requires referendum for amending Article 2 and Article 1(2). Article 33(9) bars amendment during emergency. These are indispensable to the basic-structure side of the docket.

    NP

    Nepal

    Express eternity clause
    Eternity clause

    Article 274 is both the amendment engine and the substantive limit: amendments cannot prejudice sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence or sovereignty vested in the people.

    Art. 274(1)Art. 274(2)Schedule-6
    ThresholdTwo-thirds of total then-members of both Federal Houses.
    Basic layerTextual unamendability of sovereignty/territorial integrity/independence/people’s sovereignty.
    Safe wording“Textual eternity clause, not a developed case-law basic-structure doctrine.”
    Docket note

    The proviso to Article 274(2) makes clause (1) itself unamendable. That turns the clause into the central constitutional-identity provision for Nepal.

    PK

    Pakistan

    Salient-features line under anti-review text
    Contested

    Articles 238–239 create the amendment route. The salient-features/basic-structure line must now be stated with care because Article 239(5), as amended by the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, purports to bar all court challenges to constitutional amendments.

    Art. 238Art. 239(5)Art. 239(6)Salient features
    ThresholdTwo-thirds of total membership of each House.
    Basic layerHistorically developed through salient-features/basic-structure reasoning, now textually contested by Article 239(5)–(6).
    Safe wording“Doctrinally contested; current text is expressly anti-review.”
    Docket note

    A flawless page must not say simply “Pakistan has basic structure doctrine” or simply “Pakistan has no basic structure doctrine.” The accurate formulation is contested doctrine plus current express anti-review text.

    MV

    Maldives

    Referendum-entrenched amendment model
    Referendum lock

    The Maldives has a high-supermajority amendment procedure, referendum-protected categories, a presidential non-assent referendum mechanism and an emergency amendment bar.

    Art. 262(b)Art. 265Art. 267Sixth Amendment
    ThresholdThree-quarters of total People’s Majlis membership.
    Basic layerReferendum-entrenched provisions, not a judicial basic-structure doctrine.
    2026 noteThe Eighth Amendment referendum was held on 4 April 2026 and rejected; do not incorporate it as enacted text.
    Docket note

    The older 2008 English translation must be read with later official amendments. The Sixth Amendment protects Article 262(b) itself through a referendum requirement; the 2026 Eighth Amendment proposal failed at referendum.

    LK

    Sri Lanka

    Article 83 entrenchment and pre-enactment gatekeeping
    Referendum + review

    Sri Lanka’s constitutional-identity control is concentrated in Article 83 referendum entrenchment and Supreme Court pre-enactment review under Articles 120–124.

    Art. 82Art. 83Art. 120Art. 154G
    ThresholdTwo-thirds of whole Parliament; referendum where Article 83 applies.
    Basic layerNo settled free-standing Indian-style doctrine; Article 83 and Supreme Court review do the constitutional-identity work.
    Safe wording“Map through Article 83 and pre-enactment review, not as broad basic-structure doctrine.”
    Docket note

    Article 154G is essential where Chapter XVIIA or the Ninth Schedule is amended or repealed. Article 122(3) also matters because urgent-Bill procedure does not apply to constitutional amendment, repeal, replacement, alteration or addition Bills.

    04 · Amendment routes

    Procedural paths by jurisdiction

    The route cards preserve the amendment-procedure layer while the docket now adds the basic-structure/control layer above.

    BD

    Bangladesh

    Parliamentary supermajority route, presidential assent/deemed assent, and Article 7B non-amendability.

    Bill in Parliament→2/3 total MPs→President / deemed assent→Art. 7B limit
    IN

    India

    Article 368 special-majority route, with State ratification for federal matters and basic-structure limitation.

    Either House→Special majority→State ratification if listed→Assent
    BT

    Bhutan

    Delayed joint-sitting supermajority, royal assent, referendum fallback and emergency amendment bar.

    Joint motion→Next-session 3/4→Royal assent→Referendum if withheld
    NP

    Nepal

    Federal parliamentary two-thirds route, State consent for specified matters and textual eternity clause.

    Either House→Publication→State consent if affected→2/3 both Houses
    PK

    Pakistan

    Two-thirds in each House; provincial boundary consent where applicable; current text expressly bars amendment challenges.

    Either House→2/3 each House→Province if boundary→Assent
    MV

    Maldives

    Three-quarters Majlis route with referendum-protected categories and emergency amendment lock.

    Majlis Bill→3/4 total members→Referendum if protected→Assent + Gazette
    LK

    Sri Lanka

    Two-thirds Parliament route with Supreme Court pre-enactment review and referendum for Article 83 matters.

    Constitutional Bill→SC review window→2/3 whole Parliament→Referendum if Art. 83
    05 · Function matrix

    Cross-cutting functions

    This matrix separates amendment engines, identity limits, referendum locks and review/finality controls.

    FunctionBangladeshIndiaBhutanNepalPakistanMaldivesSri Lanka
    Ordinary amendment engine14236835274238–239261–26782–85
    Basic-structure / identity sourceJudicial doctrine + Article 7BJudicial basic-structure doctrineTextual referendum/emergency limitsTextual eternity clauseSalient-features doctrine under anti-review textReferendum-entrenched categoriesArticle 83 referendum entrenchment and Supreme Court review
    Express unamendability / entrenchment7BNot listed textually in Article 368; implied by doctrine2(26), 33(9), 35274(1)239(6) says no limitation262(b), 26783
    Judicial basic-structure doctrineYesYesNo identified free-standing doctrineNo developed free-standing doctrine; textual eternity clauseContested / under current textual tensionNo identified free-standing doctrineNo settled free-standing doctrine
    Amendment-specific judicial-review / finality control26(3); 7B; doctrine13(4); 368(3)–(5); doctrineNo standalone Art. 35 review clauseNo standalone Art. 274 review clause239(5)–(6)258, 265–268 as contextual controls80, 120–124, 122(3)
    Federal / subnational consentNoneState ratification for listed mattersNoneState Assembly consent for border / Schedule-6 mattersAffected Provincial Assembly consent for boundary changeNoneProvincial Council referral under Article 154G
    Referendum roleNo ordinary referendumNo national referendumArticle 2(26) and Article 34 mechanismsNo ordinary national referendumNo amendment referendum routeArticle 262(b) and Article 265 mechanismsMandatory for Article 83 matters
    Emergency / urgency exclusionNot in Article 142 routeNot in Article 368 routeArt. 33(9)Not in Article 274 routeNot in Arts. 238–239 routeArt. 267Art. 122(3) excludes urgent-Bill route

    Comparative findings

    1

    Full judicial basic-structure doctrine: India and Bangladesh. India is the origin jurisdiction; Bangladesh has adopted the doctrine and reinforced parts of it through Article 7B.

    2

    Textual eternity clause: Nepal. Article 274(1) is the cleanest express unamendability clause in the set and is itself protected from amendment.

    3

    Referendum-entrenched identity: Sri Lanka and Maldives. Sri Lanka’s Article 83 and Maldives’ Article 262(b) protect constitutional fundamentals through popular approval rather than broad judicial doctrine.

    4

    Textual constitutional identity without doctrine: Bhutan. Bhutan’s Article 35 is constrained by referendum and emergency provisions, especially Articles 2(26) and 33(9).

    5

    Most contested basic-structure posture: Pakistan. The salient-features line exists, but post-27th Amendment Article 239(5) creates the strongest textual anti-review clause in the docket.

    6

    Most elaborate pre-enactment gatekeeping: Sri Lanka. Articles 120–124, together with Articles 82–85 and 154G, make Sri Lanka’s amendment-control system heavily front-loaded before enactment.

    Editorial source note

    This is a constitutional-amendment and basic-structure/constitutional-identity docket, not a full case-law digest. It includes leading doctrine markers only where necessary to classify the amendment limit.

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