| Bangladesh |
Judicial doctrine + textual entrenchment. |
Anwar Hossain Chowdhury; 16th Amendment line; Article 7B. |
Constitutional supremacy, democratic/republican foundations, unitary constitutional order, independence of judiciary, separation of powers and fundamental constitutional commitments, depending on the case context. |
“Bangladesh has a judicially recognized basic-structure doctrine, now reinforced by Article 7B’s textual non-amendability formula.” |
| India |
Full judicial basic-structure doctrine. |
Kesavananda Bharati; Indira Gandhi; Minerva Mills and later cases. |
Constitutional supremacy, republican and democratic government, secularism, federalism, separation of powers, judicial review, free and fair elections, limited amending power and institutional identity. |
“India is the source jurisdiction of the South Asian basic-structure doctrine: Parliament may amend, but may not damage or destroy the Constitution’s basic structure.” |
| Bhutan |
Textual constitutional-identity protection; no Indian-style doctrine identified. |
Article 2(26), Article 33(9), Article 35. |
Monarchical and territorial identity provisions protected through referendum; emergency amendment ban; equally authoritative Dzongkha and English texts. |
“Bhutan should be classified as a referendum-and-emergency-entrenchment model, not as a judicial basic-structure-doctrine model.” |
| Nepal |
Textual eternity clause. |
Article 274(1) and proviso to Article 274(2). |
Sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence of Nepal and sovereignty vested in the people. |
“Nepal uses an express eternity clause rather than a developed Indian-style basic-structure doctrine.” |
| Pakistan |
Salient-features doctrine under tension with current anti-review text. |
21st Amendment litigation; Article 239(5)–(6) as amended by 27th Amendment. |
Historically discussed salient features include Islamic provisions, federalism, parliamentary democracy and judicial independence; current text purports to bar court challenges to amendments. |
“Pakistan must be marked as doctrinally contested and textually anti-review after the 27th Amendment; do not describe the basic-structure limit as presently uncomplicated.” |
| Maldives |
Referendum-entrenched constitutional identity; no identified judicial doctrine. |
Articles 262(b), 265–267, 268; Sixth Amendment 2024; 2026 referendum episode. |
Chapter II rights and selected institutional/term provisions protected through referendum; Article 262(b) itself protected after the Sixth Amendment; emergency bar under Article 267. |
“Maldives should be treated as a high-supermajority-and-referendum-entrenchment model, not as a basic-structure case-law model.” |
| Sri Lanka |
Article 83 entrenchment and pre-enactment Supreme Court gatekeeping; no settled free-standing doctrine. |
Articles 82–85, 120–124, 154G. |
Articles 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, Article 83 itself, and term extensions beyond six years; devolution amendments trigger Article 154G referral. |
“Sri Lanka’s identity limit is best mapped through Article 83 referendum entrenchment and Supreme Court pre-enactment review, not as a broad Indian-style basic-structure doctrine.” |