As we monitor the rapid evolution of Pakistan’s constitutional architecture, our immediate focus has shifted to the Sindh High Court, where the implementation of the recently enacted constitutional amendments has precipitated a significant legal challenge. We are currently tracking a critical petition filed against a newly promulgated ordinance—pushed through by an acting governor—which fundamentally alters the jurisdictional landscape of the provincial judicature. This ordinance mandates that “Constitutional Benches” (CBs), constituted under the newly inserted Article 202A, shall possess exclusive jurisdiction over all matters falling within the purview of Article 199 of the Constitution. This development is not merely procedural; it represents a substantive ouster of jurisdiction from the regular benches of the High Court, effectively creating a parallel judicial tier within the existing framework.
The legal community has raised profound alarms regarding the coercive mechanisms embedded within this ordinance. Of particular concern is the provision that classifies a judge’s refusal or recusal from these nominated benches as potential “misconduct,” thereby subjecting them to proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council. Petitioners argue this constitutes a direct assault on the independence of the judiciary, weaponizing administrative assignments to enforce compliance. Furthermore, the ordinance’s non-obstante clause—declaring that its provisions prevail over any inconsistent laws, rules, or even judgments of the Supreme Court or High Courts—has been challenged as transgressing constitutional limits and exceeding the legislative competence of the provincial assembly.
This provincial friction must be contextualized within the broader, seismic shift occurring at the federal level following the ratification of the 27th Constitutional Amendment on November 13, 2025. This amendment has formally established the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), which now holds exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between governments and matters of public interest involving fundamental rights. As we observe the transfer of cases from the Supreme Court to the FCC and the operationalization of these new Constitutional Benches in the provinces, the legal fraternity stands at a precipice. The centralization of power, the capping of judicial tenures, and the executive’s enhanced role in judicial appointments signal a transformative, albeit contentious, new era in Pakistan’s constitutional history.
