The Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024, represents a pivotal legislative effort to institutionalize the ‘One Nation, One Election’ (ONOE) paradigm, a proposal intended to synchronize the electoral cycle for the House of the People (Lok Sabha) and all State Legislative Assemblies. This framework necessitates the insertion of a new provision, Article 82A, and consequential amendments to existing articles, specifically Articles 83, 172, and 327, which delineate the duration of central and state legislatures. The fundamental mechanism involves stipulating that the terms of all state assemblies constituted following a Presidential notification—which is to be issued on the date of the first sitting of the Lok Sabha after a general election—shall expire concurrently with the full term of the Lok Sabha. Crucially, the Bill addresses scenarios of premature dissolution by mandating that any ensuing election shall be only for the unexpired term of the dissolved house, thereby ensuring the synchronization cycle remains intact for the subsequent simultaneous election. This structural alteration is rationalized primarily on grounds of enhancing governance stability, minimizing the pervasive disruption caused by the frequent imposition of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), and reducing substantial public expenditure on perennial election cycles.
The most critical constitutional contention surrounding the Bill centers on whether this realignment compromises the nation’s federal character and infringes upon the Basic Structure doctrine. The Law Commission of India, in its submissions to the Joint Parliamentary Committee, has emphatically asserted that the proposed amendments are well within the ambit of Parliament’s power and do not breach the fundamental constitutional structure. The Commission’s position rests on the established constitutional jurisprudence recognizing India’s political architecture as quasi-federal, wherein the predominance of the Union has been consistently recognized. Therefore, the proposal to synchronize elections, even with the ensuing limited curtailment of legislative tenures, is deemed a rational procedural adjustment that is not antagonistic to democratic principles; indeed, it is argued that it strengthens democracy by facilitating governmental focus and stability.
However, a robust counter-narrative, sustained by legal scholars and constitutional experts, posits that the Bill’s effect fundamentally alters the relationship between the Union and the States, even if it avoids direct amendment of the articles mandating state ratification under the proviso to Article 368(2). Critics note that the power to unilaterally adjust the term of state assemblies, coupled with the expansive, and potentially “unfettered,” discretion granted to the Election Commission of India (ECI)—particularly under the proposed Article 82A(5) to defer a state election—risks a significant augmentation of central authority. This legislative mechanism, which arguably curtails state autonomy and the distinct electoral cycle integral to regional political accountability, suggests an erosion of the federal balance. Consequently, the contention remains that this amendment, which profoundly impacts a cornerstone of the constitutional design, should have been subjected to the procedural safeguard of ratification by at least half of the state legislatures to uphold the spirit of federalism inherent in the Constitution.
