The constitutional landscape in Zambia has reached a critical inflection point this week, precipitating a severe confrontation between the Executive branch and a coalition of civic and religious bodies. As we monitor the situation from Lusaka, the immediate catalyst is the scheduled nationwide protest for November 28, 2025, organized by the powerful Zambia Conference of Catholic Bishops (ZCCB) and allied civil society organizations. This mobilization is not merely a political demonstration but a profound legal objection to what these groups characterize as an extra-constitutional attempt to revive the substance of the controversial Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of 2025. The atmosphere is tense, with Home Affairs Minister Jack Mwiimbu issuing stern warnings of “firm, lawful action” against the demonstrators, while the Church maintains that the government’s current trajectory threatens the foundational rule of law ahead of the 2026 general elections.
To understand the gravity of this standoff, one must examine the legislative history of Bill No. 7 of 2025, which remains the ghost at the feast. Introduced in May 2025, this omnibus amendment sought to fundamentally restructure the Zambian state apparatus. Key provisions included expanding the National Assembly from 156 to 211 seats—a move critics argue facilitates patronage—and introducing a mixed-member proportional representation system. More contentiously, it proposed removing two-term limits for local government leaders and eliminating by-elections within 180 days of a general election. The legal community, including the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ), successfully challenged this bill, resulting in a landmark Constitutional Court judgment on June 27, 2025. The Court declared the bill unconstitutional, citing a fatal lack of “wide public consultation” as mandated by Article 79, thereby reinforcing the principle that constitutional alteration requires broad societal consensus, not just parliamentary arithmetic.
The current crisis stems from the government’s pivot following that judicial defeat. Rather than abandoning the reforms, the administration of President Hakainde Hichilema established a “Technical Committee on Constitutional Reform” in October 2025 to conduct new rounds of consultation. While Information Minister Cornelius Mweetwa defends this as a good-faith effort to cure the defects identified by the Court, legal observers and the opposition view it as a procedural sleight of hand. The ZCCB and CSOs argue that this committee lacks a statutory basis and is essentially a vehicle to reintroduce the rejected amendments of Bill No. 7 through the back door. This suspicion was formalized on November 18, 2025, when LAZ and other bodies petitioned the Constitutional Court to quash the Technical Committee’s Terms of Reference, arguing that the executive cannot unilaterally engineer a constitutional review process that bypasses established legislative frameworks.
From a jurisprudential perspective, the core issue is the integrity of the amendment power in a developing democracy. The Bishops’ demand to postpone any constitutional changes until after the 2026 elections reflects a fear that the amendment process is being weaponized for immediate electoral advantage—specifically to gerrymander constituencies or alter the separation of powers before the polls. The government’s counter-argument, that these reforms are necessary to operationalize the Electoral Commission’s delimitation report and enhance representation for marginalized groups, is legally plausible but politically fraught given the timing. As we watch the events of November 28 unfold, the central question for constitutional scholars is whether the Zambian state can distinguish between necessary institutional modernization and the opportunistic consolidation of executive power. The outcome of this week’s friction will likely set a precedent for constitutional stability in the region for the coming decade.
